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trade-off I welcomed enthusiastically, since I
concluded that the meeting was likely to yield
very positive results for monetary policy.
On October 5, the Chairman convened a tele-
phone conference call with the Board and the 12
Reserve Bank presidents and described in more
detail what he was planning and the logistics of
the meeting. In view of the speculative fever then
rampant and the damage that could have arisen
if word of the meeting leaked out, he told us that
reservations had been made for us at various hotels
in lieu of the one where we typically stayed. He
also pointed out that the Pope was in Washington
and that the considerable press attention that
would be devoted to his visit would provide useful
cover for our meeting.  Finally, he told us that we
would each receive by confidential wire a memo-
randum from Messrs. Axilrod and Sternlight that
would outline the possible procedures and targets
that he thought we should consider.
I ate alone at my hotel that night and did not
discover until the next day that at least one of my
fellow presidents had also stayed there. After hav-
ing studied the memorandum and other material
as carefully as I could, I went to bed quite happy,
since I was convinced that the Committee was
about to make a major improvement in our oper-
ating procedures the next day.
THE OCTOBER 6 MEETING
The meeting opened with a briefing on the
economy by Jim Kichline, the associate economist
to the Committee who typically provided the
Committee with an economic briefing, and was
followed by some discussion of economic condi-
S
ometime during the week of the
October 6, 1979, meeting of the Federal
Open Market Committee (FOMC), I
received a telephone call from Chairman
Paul Volcker, as I assume did the 11 other 
presidents of the Reserve Banks. Chairman
Volcker had just returned from a meeting of the
International Monetary Fund in Belgrade, where
the air was charged with worries about inflation,
the foreign exchange markets, and various other
forms of speculation. In his call he stated that
he was going to call a meeting of the FOMC on
Saturday, October 6, to address possible changes
in the operating procedures of the Committee to
place more emphasis on controlling the mone-
tary aggregates.
At the first two meetings following his
appointment as Chairman, I had dissented in
favor of tighter money because of worries of the
type that boiled over in Belgrade. I had not taken
these dissents lightly, because of doubts about
my own judgment and the high esteem in which
I held the Chairman, but I felt strongly that the
Committee had been inadvertently too “easy” in
a very volatile and inflationary environment that
could result in serious consequences unless the
Committee made a strong commitment to a
“tighter” policy.
I believe I remember almost precisely my
words to the Chairman as he outlined his inten-
tions for the October 6 meeting: “Mr. Chairman,
you won’t get any argument from me. I’ve thought
for a long time that we ought to adopt procedures
of the type you outlined.” My enthusiasm was
tempered by only one factor—the necessity of
missing my usual Saturday golf game, my chief
outside diversion at the time. It was, however, a
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REFLECTIONStions by members of the Committee and nonvot-
ing presidents. Messrs. Wallich and Volcker then
added some brief comments on the troublesome
situation that they had observed in Belgrade.
After having described his assessment of real
and financial conditions, Chairman Volcker out-
lined his view of the possibilities for operating
policy over the period ahead:
1. Taking measures of the traditional type,
which would include a rise in the discount
rate coupled with a “significant” increase
in the federal funds rate and a possible
increase in reserve requirements by the
Board latter that day.
2. Adopting the procedures outlined in the
Axilrod-Sternlight memo, which would
entail tailoring Desk operations to place
more emphasis on a reserve path that
would achieve money supply targets
accompanied by a widening in the range
for federal funds.
The Chairman stressed that there were risks
with either approach but suggested that new
procedures seemed necessary because the old
approach clearly had serious deficiencies. He
also cautioned that it would also be necessary to
move the federal funds rate down promptly if the
situation reversed itself. He had concluded that
both foreigners and the administration would
welcome a strong package despite some uneasi-
ness about a change in techniques. He emphasized
that he did not think the approach should be
purely mechanical, that it should give the Desk
considerable discretion in conducting operations,
and that it should be revisited when needed in
the future. He also expressed the hope that what-
ever approach was adopted would have wide-
spread support in the Committee.
Right from the beginning, there was broad
support for the new procedures, although the
strength of the support varied from participant
to participant. I believe that I was one of the most
enthusiastic supporters and would have favored
a longer-term commitment to the new procedures
than was subsequently adopted. I long ago had
begun thinking of the FOMC as occupying the
position of a monopolist that could control the
aggregates, within reasonable limits, or the federal
funds rate, but not both simultaneously. Since I
interpreted the historical empirical evidence as
demonstrating that the rate of growth in the money
supply had a much closer relationship to the price
level and output than did the federal funds rate,
I was strongly in favor of placing primary empha-
sis on the money supply and letting the federal
funds rate fluctuate as widely as necessary to
achieve the money supply target. I even went so
far as to say at one point during the meeting that
I felt better about what I’d heard that day than at
any time since I began attending meetings of the
FOMC many years before.
THE DECISION
There was a great deal of discussion about
what the appropriate numbers should be under
the new procedures toward which the Committee
seemed to be moving. Everyone was well aware
that the nature of money was changing and would
likely change further, that there was slippage
between any reserve number and the aggregates,
and that the institutional arrangements were not
perfect.
After long and arduous discussion, the
Committee settled on the following ranges for its
targets for the September-December period:
1. M1—an annual rate on the order of 41/2
percent
2. M2 and M3—an annual rate of about 71/2
percent
3. Federal funds rate—a range of 111/2 to 151/2
percent
4. An initial borrowing assumption of around
$1.5 billion
Since such rates of expansion would produce
growth in the upper parts of the ranges adopted
during the previous July meeting, the Committee
agreed that somewhat slower rates of growth
would be acceptable.
The vote in favor of the new procedures was
unanimous. The group agreed that an announce-
ment of these changes should be made promptly,
but no decision as to the exact timing was made
before the meeting adjourned.
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increase in the discount rate from 11 percent to
12 percent and established a marginal reserve
requirement of 8 percent on total managed liabili-
ties of member banks, Edge Act corporations, and
U.S. agencies and branches of foreign banks. 
I supported more emphasis on long-term tar-
geting than did most of my colleagues because
(i) I thought the market needed to be assured of
our longer-run intentions and (ii) I still felt that
targeting the federal funds rate without additional
emphasis on long-run targets was unlikely to
produce predictable behavior of the aggregates.
My main fear was that we would not raise the
federal funds rate sufficiently if we overshot the
targets, since it’s always less difficult to ease than
to tighten. As I had observed the history of the
System’s past policy actions, I felt that there was
little doubt that most of the errors of the FOMC
had resulted from having adopted too easy rather
than too tight a policy. 
In subsequent meetings after October 6, I con-
cluded that we still needed to move more rapidly
to tighten than we did. This led to my dissenting
for tighter money five out of eight times the next
two times I was a voting member during the tenure
of Chairman Volcker.  On one occasion following
a prolonged discussion, I looked up at him and
said, “It pains me, Mr. Chairman, but I think that
I should dissent again.” He smiled, glanced at me,
and said, “It doesn’t pain me!”
His comment led to some playful speculation
among some of my colleagues that he wasn’t wor-
ried about what I said because no one would pay
any attention, but I know that he never sought
“yes” participants and wanted everyone to feel
free to vote his or her convictions. Moreover, I
think he may possibly have welcomed the dissent
as a means of helping shift the consensus nearer
the position he really wanted, since a Chairman
doesn’t have the luxury of dissenting!
SUBSEQUENT DEVELOPMENTS
Subsequent years have brought many and
rapid financial innovations; it has become more
and more difficult to determine the best aggregates
to control; and the slippages between reserve
measures and aggregates have become more
troublesome. Accordingly, the FOMC abandoned
the formal setting of monetary aggregate targets
in the 1990s and began leaning primarily on the
federal funds rate as its operating target. It wisely
preserved, however, a willingness to move the
funds rate more promptly over a wider range in
response to inflationary and real economic devel-
opments—a procedure I consider the single most
important decision reached that afternoon on
October 6, 1979.
I think that the System has done a superb job
in recent years under these revised procedures and
deserves our highest praise, although I confess to
some continuing discomfort about the absence
of any formal aggregate targets. One thing seems
certain to me, however. I do not believe that such
success would have come without the bold deci-
sion the Committee made that fateful Saturday
in 1979! It is quite gratifying to have been a
small part of that group that initially launched
the Committee in what I believe has been the
correct direction. Our country—indeed, the whole
world—has benefited greatly from its commitment
and courageous decisions.
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